Russia's 81st Victory Day was the most tense of any in the post-Soviet era. The drastically reduced parade — no hardware on Red Square for the first time in 19 years, a sharply shrunken foreign turnout — was driven by a real fear that Ukraine could disrupt the celebrations. Moscow warned Kyiv of devastating strikes on decision-making centres, briefed Washington, Beijing and New Delhi on the consequences of any disruption, and pushed for the Trump-brokered three-day ceasefire.

The episode exposed the structural bind #Putin is now in. Passivity in the face of mounting Ukrainian strikes erodes his domestic standing; escalation undermines the transactional posture he is trying to maintain with Trump. At the same time the patriotic consensus is visibly cracking — mobile internet shutdowns, a rising tax burden, the spreading reach of drone attacks. Western intelligence leaks and reporting on alleged plotting against Putin amplify a sense of regime fragility. As a coup scenario this is exaggerated, but the gradual fading of Putin's credibility is real.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 9 (183), examining how Putin is navigating this moment.

On Ukraine, the Russian position has hardened — no trilateral talks before Kyiv withdraws from Donbas — as Trump's attention remains absorbed by Iran and the diplomatic process has waned. Putin made the unusual remark that the war "is coming to an end". We unpack what he actually meant — and whether the end is in fact any closer.

On Iran, Moscow is positioning Russia as a potential mediator with the conservative camp in Tehran — particularly on the uranium stockpile — keeping the door open for the moment when Washington–Tehran talks reach a fuller stalemate.

Domestically, the bulletin looks at how the Ministry of Digital Development is being drawn deeper into the FSB's orbit — against the backdrop of competing factions inside the service itself over who controls the digital sphere. It also covers the Kremlin's leadership experiment in Dagestan, Igor Chaika's unusual and divisive appointment to head Rossotrudnichestvo, and a change of Human Rights Commissioner — Moskalkova's replacement with Lantratova may complicate work with the Ukrainians.

For nearly two years, Russia's political agenda has been dominated by foreign affairs — Ukraine, the Trump diplomacy, Iran, the cycles of negotiation and failure. Over the past few weeks, the centre of gravity has shifted inward. What is emerging is a system simultaneously tightening its grip and losing some of its instinctive coordination.

The viral 18-minute address to #Putin by influencer Victoria Bonya — 30 million views, declarative loyalty combined with the implied accusation that the president has lost control of his apparatus — has triggered the most consequential question now circulating in Moscow: did she act on her own, or was the video orchestrated from inside the system? Whatever its origin, the address has fractured the official response — one faction pushed for prosecution, another quietly acknowledged the legitimacy of her irritation — and forced into the open a deeper division over the FSB-led restriction policy that elites had so far been managing in private.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 8 (182), examining the Bonya episode in depth — who might be behind it, why the system's response has fractured, and what Putin's own first public reaction to the internet restrictions on 23 April actually signals about the direction of policy.

The economic story is converging with the political one. On 15 April, Putin publicly reprimanded the economic bloc and the Central Bank — an unusual gesture that exposes a deepening contradiction between disinflationary discipline and the cabinet's demand for stimulus. With Mishustin's position now openly questioned ahead of September's #Duma elections, competition over the next government's shape is intensifying. At the same time, after three years of fighting for guarantees against de-privatisation, Russian business has now received them in a visibly circumscribed form: a long-awaited bill that codifies the very exceptions — corruption, extremism, strategic-investment claims — through which asset seizures have actually been carried out, freezing the practice in law rather than rolling it back. The detention of the top management of Eksmo, Russia's largest publisher, in a criminal case formally connected to "LGBT literature", shows how a case that began on ideological grounds can spiral into a direct threat to a sector leader — the kind of siloviki momentum that ideological legislation now generates almost on its own.
September's Duma elections will be the most uncertain in years. Mounting economic pressure, visible public discontent over internet restrictions, and an unpredictable frontline are all converging on the campaign. United Russia has finalised its candidates from the four occupied regions of Ukraine — divided unevenly between symbolic figures, local apparatchiks and externally imposed technocrats — and for the first time, the domestic policy overseers must run a federal election campaign in coordination with the security services and the armed forces, against a backdrop of unprecedented uncertainty. Putin's approval rating, meanwhile, has fallen for seven consecutive weeks to its lowest level since the start of the war.

If you follow how decisions are actually made in #Russia — the elite splits, the trade-offs, the unintended consequences of policies designed to tighten control — the full bulletin is available at https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/8-2026/bonya-s-glamorous-revolt-rattles-kremlin-putin-reprimands-economic-bloc-publicly-eksmo-detentions-hit-book-industry-de-privatisation-bill-codifies-ambiguity-united-russia-lines-up-occupied-regions?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_promo_rp&utm_content=bulletin_page

For the first time since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian elite appears to be on the brink of an internal schism. On the one hand, the Kremlin’s continued use of the war to justify new rounds of repression makes it seem as if it’s business as usual. On the other hand, unhappiness over the recent push for total control of the internet is increasingly visible, with even loyalists starting to publicly criticize the Kremlin and predict revolution.

While each individual act of criticism may seem irrelevant, together they are significant. To use a medical analogy: minor and difficult-to-explain symptoms can be a passing inconvenience—or a sign of life-threatening illness.

https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/04/russia-elites-internal-conflict

Russia's internet is being reshaped in real time. The FSB launched a simultaneous offensive this spring — mass blocking of VPN protocols, pressure on platforms to filter traffic, and the effective blocking of Telegram, now accessible only via VPN. On 3 April, a major banking outage left millions unable to make payments, with cash briefly becoming the only option — and the tightening of digital restrictions may have played a role.

Behind the headlines, however, the picture is more complex. The crackdown has opened visible rifts within the ruling establishment over the pace and scope of restrictions, with the approaching Duma elections raising the political stakes. The policy is being driven by the security bloc, but resistance is coming from unexpected quarters — and Putin's own role in the process is more ambiguous than it appears.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 7 (181), examining the internet crackdown in depth — who is driving it, who is pushing back, and what the emerging "white list" framework reveals about the kind of internet Russia is actually building.

The bulletin also covers the broader strategic picture. Moscow's reading of the Iran war and the US-Iran negotiations is reinforcing the Kremlin's maximalist stance on Ukraine — with Trump's credibility as a negotiating partner continuing to erode.

At home, the economic pressures of a prolonged war are being managed through increasingly creative mechanisms. At Putin's RSPP congress, the wartime dynamic between the state and big business was on full display — with oligarchs pledging 'voluntary' contributions to the budget in an environment that leaves increasingly little room for economic actors to maintain distance from the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, a new draft AI law is positioning the security services at the centre of Russia's technology future, with Western companies set to be effectively locked out — another front in the broader push for state control over strategic sectors.

The same logic of wartime consolidation is visible in the corporate clash between Rosatom and Delo Group over Russia's largest logistics holding — a dispute that risks escalating well beyond its commercial origins.

And as the September Duma elections approach, the Kremlin is signalling caution: the Central Election Committee has undergone the most conservative renewal in its history — a deliberate choice that speaks to the risks the leadership foresees in a wartime electoral cycle.

Separately, Pashinyan's visit to Moscow laid bare the growing tension in Russian-Armenian relations, with Putin publicly drawing lines on Armenia's Westward drift ahead of parliamentary elections in Yerevan.

The full analysis is available in the new R.Politik Bulletin No. 7 (181)

The Middle East war just dropped an unexpected financial gift on Moscow — but the real drama is unfolding inside Russia.

R.Politik Bulletin No. 6 (180) is out.

IN FOCUS
A major oil supply shock from the Iran conflict has narrowed Urals discounts and given the Kremlin short-term breathing room, helped by the temporary US waiver. Putin is treating it as temporary. The budget crisis isn’t.

Yet the domestic stories are even more striking:

• Moscow hit by sudden selective mobile blackouts where even the official whitelists failed to work, paralysing businesses, officials and daily life while testing new digital control tools.

• A prominent investor suddenly faces extremism charges and asset seizure after a bitter family dispute — a case with surprising reach into the highest levels of the hierarchy.

• The Defence Ministry is quietly recruiting university students into specialised units, creating growing tensions across the education system.

• Siberian farmers — traditionally a loyal base — are protesting serious administrative failures in veterinary services against the backdrop of sanctions, raising uncomfortable questions about political responsibility that could backfire later.

• And the most intriguing of all: well-known state propagandist Ilya Remeslo publicly turns against Putin, sparking feverish speculation about an elite split and powerful figures behind him… before quickly ending up in a psychiatric clinic.

These reports reveal the internal tensions, quiet experiments and elite dynamics you won’t see anywhere else.

The full bulletin is essential reading.

If you follow Russia’s strategic thinking, the interplay between the Middle East conflict and Ukraine, the Telegram situation, or you simply want a detailed, source-based analysis of the factors shaping decisions in Moscow — the full 45-page document is now available at R.Politik.

The Iran war is dominating global headlines — US-Israeli strikes since 28 February, Khamenei assassinated, Mojtaba now Supreme Leader, oil markets volatile over Hormuz threats, and Trump claiming the US is “very far ahead of schedule.”

Public discourse remains focused on the immediate chaos: who gains from rising #oil prices? Is this a strategic distraction for Russia in Ukraine? Will the conflict ultimately damage Western interests more than anyone else? Many analyses continue to emphasize short-term gains for Moscow.

Behind the scenes in Moscow, however, the picture is far more complex and uncertain than these surface-level assessments suggest.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 5 (179), examining how the Kremlin is actually assessing the situation: the short-term fiscal relief it is receiving, alongside the deeper strategic risks and long-term uncertainties causing genuine concern.

Key elements I highlight:
📌 Short-term fiscal relief. The surge in Brent prices — and the risk of even higher levels if the Strait of Hormuz remains threatened — is helping to close Russia’s budget deficit and replenish reserves. It also creates new opportunities for Russia to leverage energy markets to its advantage.

📌Long-term strategic concerns. Moscow views Trump’s decision to launch strikes as a serious miscalculation, driven by Israeli pressure and overconfidence following the Venezuela operation. Moscow expects that a protracted war risks radicalising Iran, entrenching hardliners, and further destabilising the region. Putin’s restrained response to Khamenei’s assassination — and the deaths of several family members — reflects deep unease over the precedent of targeting a head of state. At the same time, Trump’s recent call to Putin is seen in Moscow as a potential opening for Russia to offer its mediation services, although attempts to engage Gulf states have so far produced limited results.

The central lessons for Moscow are clear: Trump is an unpredictable partner for any negotiated settlement (the so-called “spirit of #Anchorage” is fading), negotiations can serve as cover for military preparations, reliance on allies has clear limits, and sanctions pressure often accompanies military action. The prevailing mood among Russian elites is mixed and contradictory — ranging from a sense that the situation is spiralling into a major mess to cautious hopes that the war in the Middle East could become a serious strategic setback for the US and the “collective West.”

Meanwhile, the conflict is diverting international attention and munitions from Ukraine. While the direct impact on Russian-Ukrainian peace talks remains uncertain, Moscow is preparing for the possibility of additional sanctions, increased US pressure, and a prolonged war — even as it sees potential gains from a weakening Ukrainian position. Moscow has already been seeking to relocate the negotiation process while increasing pressure on Ukraine to withdraw from the Donbas.

On the domestic front, the FSB has prevailed in its long-running confrontation with Telegram. A criminal case has been opened against Pavel Durov for assisting terrorist activity, traffic throttling has intensified, and a full ban inside Russia now appears irreversible — despite broad resistance from elites, the public, and even parts of the military. Current geopolitical developments are creating additional grounds for the FSB to expand its influence in political decision-making.

I also examine the Kremlin’s creation of a new presidential commission on AI. Internal competition is intensifying, reflecting the broader struggle for technological sovereignty and tighter state control over the digital space.

Another significant development is the arrest of Ruslan Tsalikov, a long-time associate of Sergey Shoigu. Despite his high-level connections, he now faces the prospect of a lengthy prison sentence.

This bulletin offers a non-headline perspective on how the Kremlin is recalibrating its foreign and domestic priorities in light of the events in Iran.

A rare situation has emerged in which domestic developments have overshadowed an already fraught international agenda for Russia.

The Kremlin has decided to begin throttling Telegram, the country’s most widely used social media platform for communication and access to information. Although preparations for such a move had been evident, the decision nonetheless came as a shock to many, including senior officials, businesses, and representatives of the pro-war community. The systemic opposition chose to speak out against the measure. While this carries no tangible political weight, it signals emerging discrepancies within the ruling elite. The FSB, which stands behind the decision, was compelled to justify its actions publicly. The measure is highly likely to be implemented, yet it will have a noticeable impact on public sentiment.

In international affairs, the Munich Security Conference was a central event, exposing growing transatlantic tensions and mistrust. This has occurred notwithstanding attempts by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to adopt a conciliatory tone. The discussions have intensified European debates about how to shape the continent’s future security and defence architecture without a dominant US role, and how to manage the Russia threat when Putin is failing to achieve victory in Ukraine yet is still committed to unrealistic objectives. Nuclear issues have moved to the centre of the discourse. Russia has observed these developments with limited interest but increasing concern.

With regard to Ukraine, talks in Geneva have opened a new chapter in diplomatic efforts. For the first time since April 2022, Russia has secured an opportunity to draw Ukraine into negotiations on the political aspects of a settlement — effectively a reproduction of the “Istanbul format” of 2022, to which Moscow has repeatedly referred as its preferred basis. The process, however, shows little sign of progress. Volodymyr Zelensky continues to push for a direct meeting with Putin, a scenario still unacceptable to Moscow. Kyiv faces a particularly difficult position: growing pressure from Washington, hesitant and divided European partners, and a Russia unwilling to abandon its maximalist demands.

Considerable attention has also focused on Armenia amid US Vice President JD Vance’s visit — the highest-ranking US official to ever visit the country. Armenia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in June, and Russia is expected to seek to weaken the position of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan by supporting his opponents. Moscow appears to underestimate the significance of the intensifying Armenian–American engagement and is likely to double down in order to keep Yerevan within its sphere of geopolitical influence. At the same time, the Kremlin must calibrate its actions carefully so as not to provoke President Donald Trump.

Decision-making logic, internal splits, and the real trade-offs that never make it into open sources — all unpacked in the new R.Politik Bulletin No. 4 (178).

Find out much more on the Kremlin thinking in our latest issue.

As long as Putin is in power, Russia isn’t paralyzed by widespread protests, and there is at least some money left in the budget for weapons, the war will continue. The Kremlin will not make significant concessions even if faced with a protracted financial and economic crisis. Rather, such a crisis, should it arise, would first lead to political change and only then to a revision of the war’s goals by the country’s new leadership.

That means there will be no final settlement either now or in the foreseeable future. Negotiations may intensify, a short-term ceasefire is possible, and documents may even be signed. But overall, this simulation of negotiations can only lead to the simulation of a ceasefire and the simulation of a settlement.

The main source of Russian aggression is a profound mistrust of the West and the firm belief that it intends to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. As long as this fear persists (and is shared by both the elites and society at large), the war will not end.
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/02/russia-political-war-continuation

Russian-American relations navigate a delicate phase, with Abu Dhabi trilateral talks yielding no settlement breakthroughs despite U.S. pressure for resolution before summer. Moscow deems Kyiv's sequencing plan unworkable, irritated by Washington's dismissal of prior understandings, new demands on Ukraine and hostile rhetoric in the context of Venezuela, Cuba or Russian oil. We depict these topics in detail in our fresh R.Politik Bulletin, revealing the nuances one won't find in the media.

European engagement ramps up: French diplomat Emmanuel Bonne's unannounced Moscow visit prepares potential Macron-Putin dialogue, yet unofficially the Kremlin dismisses it as substance-free, absent a fundamental European policy shift. Moscow signals openness but harbours deep skepticism.

U.S. proposal for a new nuclear deal including China puts Moscow in an awkward position: dialogue is welcomed in principle, but viewed as unrealistic amid Beijing's refusal and Russia's call for broader inclusion.

Putin's pragmatism emerges in Syrian discussions, supporting interim President al-Sharaa to restore territorial integrity and maintain a modest Russian role via military-technical ties.

Economic pressures surface through asset sales: Domodedovo Airport sold at half value to a state-linked buyer amid investor reluctance.

Lukoil's conditional Carlyle deal freezes proceeds under sanctions, a lesser-evil calculation with rival bids ongoing, betting on future geopolitical relief.

Societal impacts deepen: the state has to significantly restrict the general access to higher education, simultaneously favoring war veterans, heightening inequity perceptions.

Ahead of September Duma elections, Telegram restrictions are seen as inevitable but questioned to avoid voter backlash.

GRU Lt Gen Alexeyev's assassination attempt prompts in Moscow swift Ukraine accusations, exposing security gaps for war-linked figures and setbacks of the FSB, but unlikely to foil the negotiations.

Find out much more on the Kremlin thinking in our latest Bulletin.
https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/3-2026/abu-dhabi-negotiations-stall-new-start-expired-syria-reintegration-pragmatism-lukoil-s-carlyle-gamble-domodedovo-discounted-university-access-tightens-telegram-tug-of-war?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_promo_rp&utm_content=bulletin_page

The reaction in Moscow to Emmanuel Bonne’s trip to Russia has been mixed. On the one hand, the very fact of the visit is interpreted as a gradual shift in European attitudes to the conflict, reflecting a reluctant acceptance of the need to engage with Russia. On the other hand, the substance of the trip is still regarded as “hostile”.

For Vladimir Putin, the visit is not about efforts to reconcile the two sides of the conflict. Europe is perceived as being aligned with Ukraine and therefore as a party to the conflict itself. From this perspective, the trip is seen instead as an attempt by Paris to improve its position among Western partners, particularly in relation to Donald Trump and the participants in the so-called coalition of the willing.

However, preparations are reportedly underway for a telephone call between Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin, and it already appears inevitable that Europe is moving towards more consistent engagement with Moscow. The Kremlin is signalling a degree of openness to such contacts but remains deeply sceptical about what Europe can offer, beyond a demand that Russia abandon its objectives in Ukraine—something which, from Moscow’s point of view, appears naive, given that Europe lacks the resources and leverage to compel such a shift.

Over the past two weeks, the geopolitical cycle has intensified and become more volatile. The Maduro extraction was followed by Trump’s forceful threat to annex Greenland, accompanied by sustained pressure on Denmark and other European NATO allies. The chaos at Davos—marked by gloomy interventions from the leaders of Canada and Belgium, unexpected criticism of Europe by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and a series of disrupted meetings—reflected a broader sense of fragmentation in the global order.

In the latest R.Politik bulletin, we examine how Russia is interpreting and positioning itself within this evolving context. While Trump’s modus operandi—characterised by force, pressure, blackmail, and incompetence—is undoubtedly alarming to Moscow, it also creates significant tactical openings. The Kremlin has adjusted its position on both the Greenland claim and Trump’s Board of Peace initiative, carefully balancing strategic interests with potential situational gains.

Amid these shifts, a new round of discussions on the war in Ukraine has begun. The first Russia–Ukraine–US trilateral talks took place in Abu Dhabi, following a preparatory visit to Moscow by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. What does the choice of the Russian delegation tell us? What are Putin’s intentions? What does the Kremlin expect to see further, demonstrating pragmatism coupled with still-actual maximalist demands?

On the domestic front, January brought unusual delays in wage payments to social workers in several regions—a reflection of growing economic imbalances and mounting budgetary pressure at the regional level.

At the same time, the Kremlin has accelerated preparations for the State Duma elections, as indicated by a leaked draft list of United Russia’s leading candidates. The list, headed by Dmitry Medvedev and Sergey Lavrov, points not only to early electoral planning but also to ongoing internal wrangling over the party’s configuration and prospective personnel changes.

Finally, an emergency in the Belgorod region—where hundreds of thousands of residents were left without heating or electricity following Ukrainian retaliatory strikes—has exposed serious weaknesses in crisis response and the federal centre’s reluctance to publicly acknowledge the severity of the disruption.

For those monitoring how the Russian state is adjusting—strategically and structurally—this bulletin offers grounded, non-public insight essential for understanding what comes next.

https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/2-2026/abu-dhabi-talks-begin-putin-weighs-trump-s-council-fiscal-strains-surface-duma-list-leaks-belgorod-exposed?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_promo_rp&utm_content=bulletin_page

🚨 Why is Moscow perplexed by Trump's swift Venezuela "special operation"—and how is it reshaping Putin's Ukraine calculations?
As headlines buzz with Maduro's capture, US oil control, Greenland threats, and stalled Ukraine talks, my new R.Politik Bulletin No. 1 (175) reveals Russia's contradictory responses and strategic shifts you won't find in mainstream coverage.

With 2026 off to a turbulent start—US seizures of Russian-linked tankers, NATO tensions over Greenland, and fears of Venezuelan oil flooding markets—this edition unpacks the pressures converging on Russian policymaking.

Key insights you'll find inside:

📌Ukraine Peace Talks on the Brink: US, Ukraine, and Europe near a full framework with NATO-style security guarantees—leaving Moscow in a precarious spot: disrupt without alienating Trump. After an alleged drone hit on Putin's residence and a fresh Oreshnik strike on Lviv, Russia's hardening its stance: Will Putin retract earlier "Anchorage deal" concessions?

📌Venezuela Shockwaves in Moscow: Trump's Maduro capture sparks apprehension, awe, and discord. Ultra-patriots express indignation at the "embarrassing" contrast to Ukraine's prolonged war; some in leadership debate if it's a threat or opens a "new wonder world." Exclusive: Moscow's confused reaction and how it views this as a blow to the international order.

📌Greenland Factor Looms: As Trump doubles down on acquiring the territory "at any cost," testing NATO unity—Putin sees tactical opportunities in disrupting alliances short-term, prioritizing less confrontation with the US and more hostility toward Europe.

📌Domestic Developments: Putin's year-end meeting with big business signals pessimism amid inflation and stagnation. Plus, speculation swirls on Dmitry Kozak: Prime minister contender or sidelined figure?

📌Rising Xenophobia Wave: Anti-migrant backlash surges with Indian laborers' influx, exposing rifts between security hawks and economy chiefs facing labor shortages.

2026 Outlook: What Russians really expect this year, plus hard data on 2025's industrial slowdown locking in "economy mode."

This bulletin cuts through the noise with exclusive analysis on Russia's opportunistic pivot—less confrontational toward the US, more hostile to Europe—amid a world order in flux. If you're tracking Venezuela Crisis, Ukraine War, or Trump's assertive moves, this is your insider edge.
Subscribe to R.Politik for the full issue, archives, and future deep dives—stay ahead in 2026's geopolitical storm.


https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/1-2026/trump-seizes-maduro-ukraine-talks-advance-moscow-hardens-line-kozak-s-future-questioned-business-voices-discontent?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_promo_rp&utm_content=bulletin_page

As 2025 draws to a close, the Ukraine-Russia peace talks remain stalled—but why is Moscow growing even more cautious about Trump's latest push? In my new R.Politik Bulletin No. 22 (174), I dive deep into the diplomatic maneuvering that's shaping the endgame.

Key insights you'll find inside:

- Ukraine Diplomatic Drama: Russia has lost the initiative in Trump's renewed peace efforts. What started as hopes for broad US-Russia talks in early December fizzled into tough Berlin negotiations between @SEPeaceMissions /@jaredkushner and Kyiv. Moscow views the emerging framework—with its shifted focus on securing a strong Ukraine and NATO-style guarantees—as a threat to its position. Kirill @kadmitriev 's Miami trip? He had a narrow mission beyond the necessity to negotiate. While Americans see progress, some "less important" issues are definitely underestimated—a mistake that leads to future “unexpected” moves by the Russian side being interpreted as a change in position, when in fact no such change would have occurred.
A demilitarized zone? Possible, but only under Russia's specific terms.

- Putin's Ceasefire Ploy: A short air ceasefire to allow Ukraine's presidential election, but only if 5-10 million Ukrainians in "Russian territory" (including occupied areas) can vote. This is not a concession but a clear tactic aimed at preventing Zelensky's re-election or a similar hardliner from complicating Moscow's maximalist demands.

- Belarus as Backchannel: Lukashenko's US-Russia triangle is paying off—over 100 political prisoners released, sanctions eased. Many believe that's the way to pull Belarus away from Russia, but Putin sees benefits and very low risks.

- Putin in Ashgabat: At the "Peace and Trust" forum in Turkmenistan, Russia signals pragmatism with the Global South. No demands for war support, but value in non-ideological engagement despite disagreements.

- Domestic Crackdowns: Social media bans accelerate—WhatsApp and Telegram slowed, but Roblox blocks sparked a "children's rebellion." Inconsistencies and contradictions in policymaking between different factions complicate decisions, especially concerning Generation Alpha—a specific concern for domestic policy overseers.

- Chechnya Infighting: Kadyrov's term expires in the coming year, while the war and his health issues fuel competition and fighting around the future transition process in this strategically important region of the North Caucasus.

- Kursk Protests: Social discontent spikes over canceled property payouts—politically risky, but federal "economy mode" forces compliance amid deficits.

And Russia's economy? Locked in deficit for years, shifting to "economy mode."

This bulletin unpacks what the media misses: exclusive analysis on why the current peace attempt is faltering and will need months of diplomacy.

If you're tracking Russian politics, geopolitics, or the Ukraine war, this is essential reading. Subscribe to R.Politik for full access, archives, and future bulletins—stay ahead with insider perspectives.

R.Politik Bulletin №21 (173) is now available.

This edition examines the Witkoff–Kushner visit to Moscow and its implications for the U.S. peace proposal, now reorganized into four thematic areas.
Putin has rejected certain provisions but has advanced a bilateral U.S.–Russia framework for further talks, sidelining Europe and positioning Ukraine to address challenging territorial issues.
Key questions center on U.S. willingness for structured, inter-agency engagement with Moscow.

We also cover:
• Putin’s India trip: Efforts to resolve payment complexities in an imbalanced trade relationship.
• Bishkek talks and CSTO summit: Proposals for nuclear energy and arms to strengthen alliances.
• Orbán’s Moscow meetings: Discussions on Lukoil assets and Hungary’s potential as a venue for U.S.–Russia dialogue.
• Banks vs. marketplaces: Emerging tensions between financial institutions and e-commerce platforms.
• The Dolina case: A real estate dispute escalating into broader institutional and political scrutiny.

Detailed analysis of decision-making processes not covered in public reporting.

Some brief thoughts on the recent Witkoff–Ushakov–Dmitriev leaks and the broader state of the peace talks.

1. Moscow faces a serious structural problem: whom should it actually talk to on the American side?
- Steve Witkoff is convenient and receptive to Russian ideas, but he is bureaucratically isolated and politically fragile. He takes well-known Russian positions, repackages them, and watches them die almost immediately.
- Trump himself refuses to dive into details.
- Marco Rubio is unenthusiastic about Russian input and struggles to find common ground with Lavrov.

Passing proposals through Witkoff may feel tactically easy, but it lacks any real administrative weight. The latest leaks only exacerbate this weakness.

As for Dan Driscoll, he arrived in Abu Dhabi rather naïvely hoping to meet Russian counterparts (Moscow had ignored his earlier feelers for talks with, say, Belousov). He left empty-handed because he simply wasn’t talking to the right people: the Kremlin still doesn’t know in what capacity he is acting or what mandate he actually carries.

2. There is no question that the 28-point plan reflects a large share of Russian priorities. Yet problems remain:
- Some clauses directly contradict core Russian demands (e.g., the permitted size of the Ukrainian army, the absence of a total ban on long-range weapons).
- The wording leaves considerable latitude for interpretation and risks being substantially diluted once implementation begins.

3. Moscow genuinely doesn’t know what document we are even talking about. 28 points? 19 points? The 19-point paper itself is not finalised because Zelenskyy still needs to raise several acute issues directly with Trump. The Kremlin wants an official, written text with clear status that it can work from. For now, it is simply waiting.

I see nothing at the moment that would force Putin to recalculate his goals or abandon his core demands. Those demands have remained essentially unchanged for over two years (with some adjustments, of course). He feels more confident than ever about the battlefield situation and is convinced that he can wait until Kyiv finally accepts that it cannot win and must negotiate on Russia’s well-known terms. If the Americans can help move things in that direction—fine. If not, he knows how to proceed anyway. That is the current Kremlin logic.

https://x.com/Stanovaya/status/1993783148073898427

📢 New R.Politik Bulletin №20 (172) just released.

What’s really happening behind the curtain as Trump’s team pushes a “peace plan” that reads suspiciously like Moscow’s wishlist?

We dissect:
• How much of the Witkoff-Kushner draft was shaped in the Kremlin
• Kirill Dmitriev’s quiet role as go-between
• Why even Russian insiders call the wording “ambiguous”
• Exact signals to watch in the coming weeks

Plus:
• FSB’s aggressive new grip on all digital communications (and the turf war it’s triggering inside the regime)
• Putin–Tokayev: walking the sanctions tightrope with Kazakhstan
• EU visa ban fallout: weaponised for domestic propaganda, crippling the anti-war diaspora
• “Technology levy” squeezing the IT sector dry

Details and context that go beyond what’s visible in open sources.

Read the full bulletin (subscribers only)

https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/20-2025/witkoff-kushner-plan-tokayev-s-state-visit-fsb-expands-digital-controls-schengen-visa-limits-new-technology-levy?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_promo_rp&utm_content=bulletin_page

📌 R.Politik Bulletin 19 (171) is out now.

IN FOCUS:
A rare institutional clash in the Russian power system. Zaporizhzhia head Yevgeny Balitsky’s attempt to subordinate the regional election commission and dismiss its head triggered a backlash from the Central Election Commission, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Presidential Administration.

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:
– US nuclear tests: Moscow elaborates possible responses amid growing arms control uncertainty
– Lavrov’s "disappearance": Who is acting against the foreign minister, and why
– State Duma 2026 campaign: AI tools used for voter profiling and targeting
– Venezuela: Moscow navigates its position amid rising external pressure
– Tver’s new governor: Appointment process highlights wartime staffing issues
– Belousov’s new deputy: Move to align Defence Ministry with defence industry
– Lukoil–Gunvor deal blocked by OFAC, raising risk of nationalisation or asset loss

This issue delivers detail on internal decisions and policy recalibration unavailable in open sources.

https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/19-2025/electoral-clash-exposes-system-tensions-nuclear-uncertainty-grows-venezuela-pressure-builds-lavrov-targeted-ai-enters-campaign?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_promo_rp&utm_content=bulletin_page

The latest R.Politik Bulletin No. 17 (169) is now available, offering an in-depth look at Russia’s shifting external and domestic landscape in early October 2025.

IN FOCUS
We analyse the entrenched tactical deadlock between Russia and the United States, where political dialogue has stalled and military risk is rising. Moscow’s attempt to revive the Anchorage framework now coincides with Washington’s deliberations on supplying Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine—an escalation the Kremlin equates with a nuclear threat. At the same time, Europe’s tougher posture—moves to unlock frozen Russian assets, constrain the “shadow fleet,” and develop an air-defence shield over western Ukraine—has deepened systemic confrontation.


SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
- Wartime fiscal tightening: the 2026–2028 budget entrenches a long-term “war economy.”
- “Nuclear Week” in Moscow: Russia leverages its atomic sector for strategic signalling.
- The Momotov case: prosecution extends into the judiciary.
- Moldova’s elections: results expose limits of Russian influence in the region.
- New envoy to the Northwestern District: occasional personnel policy.
- Indicators: record fuel prices; mobilisation fears rising, war-support levels stable.

At the start of the year, when Trump first took office as president, people kept asking me: What happens when he gets disillusioned with Putin? Back then, it seemed unlikely—Trump's someone shaped by circumstances, and it's hard to picture some permanent "disillusionment" setting in. And I was right for months.

But now, things seem to be shifting. It's not just Trump—his post yesterday about Ukraine's potential to win reflects some new realities (or at least new perceptions of old ones). The shift? This spring and summer, doubts grew in the West that Ukraine could hold out. Russia ramped up its offensive, Trump hinted Russia was winning, and plenty of folks privately thought Ukraine was toast. Months later, and we're stuck in the same spot. Russia hasn't turned its tactical military edge into any strategic breakthrough. If you look at what Putin really wants in Ukraine—institutional changes for a "friendly" regime, a drastically downsized army, guarantees against NATO expansion, etc.—Russia's no closer after 3.5 years. Sure, they've grabbed more land, but that's not what the war's about.

Meanwhile, Russia's economy is looking rough, with a foggy outlook ahead. Putin will keep fighting despite resource limits—nothing will make him quit—but the current setup doesn't scream "big victory." Caveat: unless Ukraine implodes on its own. But even if it does (and many in Moscow are banking on that), it's no sure thing it'd help to make Ukraine "friendly." If anything, the opposite: massive political chaos would make deals even harder, let alone enforcing them. No matter how destabilized Ukraine gets, there won't be a new Istanbul 2 or Minsk 3 that actually sticks. That's Putin's big strategic blunder—he truly believes Ukraine will end up in his pocket eventually.

What's scary here is the risk of a sharp escalation in fighting. Ukraine isn't cracking, Trump's no longer an ally... So what's left? Double down on the war machine...