The Iran war is dominating global headlines — US-Israeli strikes since 28 February, Khamenei assassinated, Mojtaba now Supreme Leader, oil markets volatile over Hormuz threats, and Trump claiming the US is “very far ahead of schedule.”

Public discourse remains focused on the immediate chaos: who gains from rising #oil prices? Is this a strategic distraction for Russia in Ukraine? Will the conflict ultimately damage Western interests more than anyone else? Many analyses continue to emphasize short-term gains for Moscow.

Behind the scenes in Moscow, however, the picture is far more complex and uncertain than these surface-level assessments suggest.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 5 (179), examining how the Kremlin is actually assessing the situation: the short-term fiscal relief it is receiving, alongside the deeper strategic risks and long-term uncertainties causing genuine concern.

Key elements I highlight:
📌 Short-term fiscal relief. The surge in Brent prices — and the risk of even higher levels if the Strait of Hormuz remains threatened — is helping to close Russia’s budget deficit and replenish reserves. It also creates new opportunities for Russia to leverage energy markets to its advantage.

📌Long-term strategic concerns. Moscow views Trump’s decision to launch strikes as a serious miscalculation, driven by Israeli pressure and overconfidence following the Venezuela operation. Moscow expects that a protracted war risks radicalising Iran, entrenching hardliners, and further destabilising the region. Putin’s restrained response to Khamenei’s assassination — and the deaths of several family members — reflects deep unease over the precedent of targeting a head of state. At the same time, Trump’s recent call to Putin is seen in Moscow as a potential opening for Russia to offer its mediation services, although attempts to engage Gulf states have so far produced limited results.

The central lessons for Moscow are clear: Trump is an unpredictable partner for any negotiated settlement (the so-called “spirit of #Anchorage” is fading), negotiations can serve as cover for military preparations, reliance on allies has clear limits, and sanctions pressure often accompanies military action. The prevailing mood among Russian elites is mixed and contradictory — ranging from a sense that the situation is spiralling into a major mess to cautious hopes that the war in the Middle East could become a serious strategic setback for the US and the “collective West.”

Meanwhile, the conflict is diverting international attention and munitions from Ukraine. While the direct impact on Russian-Ukrainian peace talks remains uncertain, Moscow is preparing for the possibility of additional sanctions, increased US pressure, and a prolonged war — even as it sees potential gains from a weakening Ukrainian position. Moscow has already been seeking to relocate the negotiation process while increasing pressure on Ukraine to withdraw from the Donbas.

On the domestic front, the FSB has prevailed in its long-running confrontation with Telegram. A criminal case has been opened against Pavel Durov for assisting terrorist activity, traffic throttling has intensified, and a full ban inside Russia now appears irreversible — despite broad resistance from elites, the public, and even parts of the military. Current geopolitical developments are creating additional grounds for the FSB to expand its influence in political decision-making.

I also examine the Kremlin’s creation of a new presidential commission on AI. Internal competition is intensifying, reflecting the broader struggle for technological sovereignty and tighter state control over the digital space.

Another significant development is the arrest of Ruslan Tsalikov, a long-time associate of Sergey Shoigu. Despite his high-level connections, he now faces the prospect of a lengthy prison sentence.

This bulletin offers a non-headline perspective on how the Kremlin is recalibrating its foreign and domestic priorities in light of the events in Iran.