R.Politik
@rpolitik
Some thoughts two days before the Trump–Putin meeting:
1.The initiative for the meeting comes from Vladimir Putin, who has become more open to the idea following what he perceives as a new opportunity, reinforced by Steve Witkoff’s visit to Moscow and Donald Trump’s reluctance to enter into a new confrontation with Russia or to inherit what he sees as “Biden’s war”.
2.Witkoff allegedly put forward a vision for a possible settlement, centred on the idea of a territorial swap, though this is unlikely to be the sole focus. Yuri Ushakov’s statement that there is now an “acceptable proposal” suggests that Witkoff’s ideas went beyond the question of territory. As I have noted many times, Putin is not fighting merely for land but for what he considers a “friendly” Ukraine, as he defines it (I have written about it so many times).
3.Witkoff’s suggestions are not regarded in Moscow as a workable draft settlement plan, but rather as an acceptable starting point for discussion. Putin, by contrast, already has a detailed plan, developed long ago, which can be adjusted depending on progress made on each of its main elements.
4.Only a small number of individuals in Moscow are aware of the full details of this plan. As a result, there have been numerous interpretations, both in Russia and abroad, as well as politically biased speculation.
5.Stripped of political narratives and competing interests, and based on Putin’s own statements and actions, his core demands have not changed. While territory is a key element, the demands for NATO non-expansion, the demilitarisation of Ukraine, and the “denazification” remain in place, even if they are not the primary focus in public discourse right now.
6.My understanding is that Putin is prepared to exchange territory in the following order: Russian withdrawal from Kharkiv or Dnipro and Sumy oblasts; Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk and Luhansk; and the establishment of a frozen contact line in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. However, this is not his primary concern. His central objective lies in obtaining what he calls “security guarantees” — in effect, the geopolitical “neutralisation” of Ukraine.
7.Putin intends to propose to Trump that the war be brought to an end, and will press the point that he genuinely wishes it to stop. His main objective is to persuade Trump that Europe and the current Ukrainian leadership are the obstacles to ending the conflict, and that a cessation of hostilities is possible if there are guarantees that Ukraine will not use any pause to rearm. Putin will strongly promote the idea that the US and Russia are two great nations that should maintain good relations regardless of local conflicts.
8.Many Western media outlets and analysts depict Putin as a master manipulator, over-prepared for meetings and adept at exploiting his counterpart’s lack of preparation. While there is truth in this, Putin’s interactions with Trump — both in person and by telephone — have not shown him to be particularly successful in finding a language or style of argument that is persuasive to Trump. Moreover, the “core causes” of the conflict are conceptually complex for Western audiences unaccustomed to reasoning within this particular geopolitical framework. In my experience, it is extremely difficult to convey what is truly at stake in these “core causes”, even to well-informed and sophisticated interlocutors, as people often simply cannot accept that Putin might want so much — and be serious about it. Unfortunately, he can. Those to whom Russians have to explain the “core causes” tend to underestimate or entirely dismiss the significance of the geopolitical demands that Putin regards as essential.
9.Based on Trump’s own statements and my observations, I believe that widespread speculation about behind-the-scenes preparations for a settlement is largely unfounded. While there have been contacts and some exploratory efforts, nothing substantial enough has emerged to be described as bilateral preparation for a deal.
1.The initiative for the meeting comes from Vladimir Putin, who has become more open to the idea following what he perceives as a new opportunity, reinforced by Steve Witkoff’s visit to Moscow and Donald Trump’s reluctance to enter into a new confrontation with Russia or to inherit what he sees as “Biden’s war”.
2.Witkoff allegedly put forward a vision for a possible settlement, centred on the idea of a territorial swap, though this is unlikely to be the sole focus. Yuri Ushakov’s statement that there is now an “acceptable proposal” suggests that Witkoff’s ideas went beyond the question of territory. As I have noted many times, Putin is not fighting merely for land but for what he considers a “friendly” Ukraine, as he defines it (I have written about it so many times).
3.Witkoff’s suggestions are not regarded in Moscow as a workable draft settlement plan, but rather as an acceptable starting point for discussion. Putin, by contrast, already has a detailed plan, developed long ago, which can be adjusted depending on progress made on each of its main elements.
4.Only a small number of individuals in Moscow are aware of the full details of this plan. As a result, there have been numerous interpretations, both in Russia and abroad, as well as politically biased speculation.
5.Stripped of political narratives and competing interests, and based on Putin’s own statements and actions, his core demands have not changed. While territory is a key element, the demands for NATO non-expansion, the demilitarisation of Ukraine, and the “denazification” remain in place, even if they are not the primary focus in public discourse right now.
6.My understanding is that Putin is prepared to exchange territory in the following order: Russian withdrawal from Kharkiv or Dnipro and Sumy oblasts; Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk and Luhansk; and the establishment of a frozen contact line in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. However, this is not his primary concern. His central objective lies in obtaining what he calls “security guarantees” — in effect, the geopolitical “neutralisation” of Ukraine.
7.Putin intends to propose to Trump that the war be brought to an end, and will press the point that he genuinely wishes it to stop. His main objective is to persuade Trump that Europe and the current Ukrainian leadership are the obstacles to ending the conflict, and that a cessation of hostilities is possible if there are guarantees that Ukraine will not use any pause to rearm. Putin will strongly promote the idea that the US and Russia are two great nations that should maintain good relations regardless of local conflicts.
8.Many Western media outlets and analysts depict Putin as a master manipulator, over-prepared for meetings and adept at exploiting his counterpart’s lack of preparation. While there is truth in this, Putin’s interactions with Trump — both in person and by telephone — have not shown him to be particularly successful in finding a language or style of argument that is persuasive to Trump. Moreover, the “core causes” of the conflict are conceptually complex for Western audiences unaccustomed to reasoning within this particular geopolitical framework. In my experience, it is extremely difficult to convey what is truly at stake in these “core causes”, even to well-informed and sophisticated interlocutors, as people often simply cannot accept that Putin might want so much — and be serious about it. Unfortunately, he can. Those to whom Russians have to explain the “core causes” tend to underestimate or entirely dismiss the significance of the geopolitical demands that Putin regards as essential.
9.Based on Trump’s own statements and my observations, I believe that widespread speculation about behind-the-scenes preparations for a settlement is largely unfounded. While there have been contacts and some exploratory efforts, nothing substantial enough has emerged to be described as bilateral preparation for a deal.
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