Breaking news is emerging: Trump is expected to meet Putin in the coming days, and the two may even meet Zelensky immediately afterwards. There is a sense of anticipation—some see this as a potential turning point in the conflict, possibly even the beginning of the end of the war. I would be happy to be proved wrong, but this is not how I see it. I do not observe any substantive change in Russian tactics towards Trump or #Ukraine.

Trump had sent Steve Witkoff to speak with Putin. As he has done before, Putin used the meeting to suggest that Russia would be ready to halt the war immediately—though, of course, only under specific conditions. This is neither a response to Trump’s threats of further sanctions nor a sign of Russian exhaustion. Witkoff travelled to Moscow and heard exactly what he would have heard regardless of sanctions pressure: that the war could end at any moment, provided the so-called “root causes” are addressed.

However these conditions are worded, they amount to the same demand: Ukraine stops resisting, the West halts arms supplies, and Kyiv accepts Russia’s terms, which effectively amount to a de facto capitulation.

The Russian side can frame this in a dozen different ways, creating the impression that Moscow is open to concessions and serious negotiation. It has been doing so for some time, but the core position remains unchanged: Russia wants Kyiv to surrender (I have already discussed what this would involve and will not repeat it here).

Trump and Putin may meet soon, and it is also possible they will declare some form of progress. We could then see a version of Helsinki 2—not the one Moscow wants, but something akin to the 2018 meeting. It is also conceivable that Putin would agree to meet Zelensky, as he has said repeatedly, though only if there is a prearranged agenda and predetermined outcomes, which remains difficult to imagine.

The likely scenario is that this peace effort will fail once again. Russia will continue its campaign, and in a few months, there may be a new round of talks—this time under even worse conditions for Ukraine. Perhaps there will be another agreement, something like Istanbul 2, which would collapse long before even minimal implementation, just as Minsk 2 did.

This would be a negative outcome for Ukraine, but it would not deliver Ukraine to Putin on a plate either, at least not in the way he wants it. The conflict, alternating between open warfare and periods of simmering tension, appears likely to persist for the foreseeable future.