The Russian memorandum is out. The document largely reiterates the same Russian demands that were included in the Istanbul drafts discussed in March–April 2022. Only part of it was agreed upon by Ukraine. Now, predictably, Russia puts forward its list of demands, still unchanged, where, as Russian diplomats like to say, Ukraine is not supposed to choose options but to accept the entire “package”.

The first section outlines the demands—referred to as “parameters”—implying that details can be discussed later. However, these discussions would focus not on the core demands but on their implementation, leaving Kyiv with little room to negotiate. As I have written many times, these demands aim to secure a “friendly” Ukraine (meaning no “nazis”—in effect, a ban on “anti-Russian forces”), no full-fledged army, and no military partnership of any kind with Western allies.

The second part is somewhat hypocritical. It ostensibly proposes two options: either Kyiv withdraws from the annexed regions, or it proceeds directly to the second, more developed option, which effectively ensures that Ukraine cannot resume any military activities, rescinds martial law, and holds a presidential election. In simple terms, Moscow knows that the first option is not viable and seeks to push Kyiv towards the second as the primary course. But it also means—and this is important—that Russia is open to considering leaving parts of the annexed regions that it does not control to Ukraine. However, as Putin would say, there are nuances. Under the second option, Ukraine would have no chance of resuming fighting. It is also worth noting that the first option, although seemingly beneficial for Russia, is actually less preferable than the second, as it does not address the key issue—Western military aid. They simply do not believe it is politically feasible, and I think they are right.

The third section concerns the sequence of steps. Russia is prepared to sign the memorandum with the current authorities, though I believe they will insist that it be the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, not Zelensky. The final agreement—not the memorandum—is expected to be signed by the new president. Once the memorandum is signed (which would indicate Ukraine’s preliminary agreement to the general demands), Ukraine is supposed to begin implementing either the first or second option from part two and complete it within 30 days—the period for which Russia agrees to a ceasefire.

“It’s not an ultimatum,” said Medinsky. He also stated, on 16 May, that if Ukraine does not give up, it will have to endure a prolonged Russian invasion. Yesterday, Ukraine demonstrated its “card” with an attack on Russian strategic forces. Now Russia responds—Kyiv has no “cards”. The fighting is set to continue, even if bilateral interactions persist.