One can observe two opposing attitudes towards what Putin wants in the context of the war in Ukraine, and both are, unfortunately, biased—whether deliberately or not. The first assumes that Putin does not wish to end the war, that time is on his side, and that he has no interest in peace talks. This view is often used to justify increased military aid to Ukraine, the imposition of further sanctions on Russia, and the dismissal of Putin’s statements about peace. It suggests that increased sanctions and a stronger Ukraine could compel Putin to stop.

The second attitude holds that Putin is struggling to win the war, having gained very little territory over three years while suffering heavy losses, and therefore requires a deal. This position typically assumes that the main challenge is enabling him to save face domestically. It also implies that Putin may be prepared to offer more significant concessions than it appears. Its proponents genuinely believe that he is incapable of meaningfully improving Russia’s military position in Ukraine. From this, some argue that the time has come to engage in negotiations, as they believe a meaningful agreement is achievable. Others, however, adopt the conclusions of the first approach and advocate for increasing military support to Ukraine.

In reality, both views are simultaneously right and mistaken. Putin does want to end the war—but only on his own terms. From his perspective, the war must continue as long as Kyiv rejects Russian demands, serving as a means to pressure Ukraine into eventual compliance. The continuation of hostilities is not an objective in itself but a consequence of the failure to secure a favourable settlement through the limited use of military force. This distinction is crucial: the capacity to capture an entire country is fundamentally different from a strategy combining gradual aggression with a constant threat of escalation. Even the annexation of four regions in September 2022 occurred without full physical control of the territories.

In Putin's vision, “victory”— Kyiv’s de facto capitulation—achieved solely through military means would be costly and is therefore far less desirable. One should recall how he sought to “win” the war in the first week of the invasion, counting on the Ukrainian army not resisting and the leadership fleeing.

What he truly wants is for Ukrainians to accept that they cannot win, that there is no point in continuing to fight against Russia, and that Moscow is prepared to persevere regardless of the cost because it views the conflict as existential. He believes this implies the losing side should capitulate in advance—a rather cynical stance. Accordingly, the high cost of war and Russia’s heavy losses do not prompt a reassessment of Putin’s goals or intentions. Instead, they make the pursuit of “capitulation” all the more urgent—currently, by appealing to Trump while simultaneously maintaining significant military pressure on Ukraine.