The higher the expectations for a ceasefire and a deal on Ukraine, the more discussions emerge about the issue of “SVO veterans” in Russia. The topic is being fuelled from multiple directions. On one side, there are domestic policy overseers who are forced to deal with it, reallocating resources in anticipation of potential problems and surprises, preparing to be fully equipped in case of a large-scale and “sudden” return of troops. On the other, opposition circles engage in a degree of wishful thinking, believing that such a return would pose a challenge to the regime. Then there are the usual information speculators—well-known Telegram channels profiting from engagement on the issue. Lastly, foreign audiences are closely watching the situation, viewing it as a looming test for the government, which could stumble and lose control.

The same applies to the so-called “problematic electorate”—various opponents of a “shameful peace,” a reference to the 1996 Khasavyurt Accord with Chechen separatists. The presidential administration is preparing to deal with them as part of its standard responsibilities. However, foreign observers tend to exaggerate the risks posed by ultra-patriots. In Russia, too, the issue of dealing with the “angry patriots” has become lucrative, particularly given the competition among different agencies.

In my view, both issues are significantly overblown. I am not saying they don’t exist—“SVO veterans” and “angry patriots” do present real risks for the authorities. But the regime is structured in such a way that neither can pose a serious challenge to stability. The system does not allow for independent self-organisation (which applies to the patriots) or mass expressions of discontent. The “shameful peace” of 1996 and a potential one in 2025 are fundamentally different scenarios. In the former case, the state was in deep crisis; in the latter, it is at the peak of its repressive and financial strength (with some caveats indeed).

Moreover, securing a “shameful peace” is a challenge in itself. No matter what Putin and Trump might agree on, the outcome could still end up as yet another set of unworkable Minsk-style agreements—meaning the risk of returning to war remains extremely high. But that, as they say, is another story.