In Western circles today, two predominant views on Russia are apparent.

The first view suggests that Russia is in a dire state: the economy is teetering on the edge (yes, there is money now, but everything could collapse or be depleted very soon). The elites are in turmoil over the war and Putin, weaving conspiracies and poised for drastic actions, which could become evident at any moment. The populace is discontent, with protests occurring nationwide (this includes typical arguments about the wives of mobilized men, Dagestan, and other local demonstrations). The population is, in fact, opposed to Putin and the war, with poll results skewed because respondents fear speaking the truth.

The second view holds that domestically, Russia is stronger than ever: the populace has become Putin's principal ally, the elites are growing richer and profiting from the war, making Putin more indispensable to them than ever. However, Russia is like a black box, making it futile to try to comprehend what is happening; it's better to isolate oneself from it and formulate policies related not so much to Russia itself (since we have no influence there) but in response to Russia.

Both views are politically charged. The first largely rests on wishful thinking and functions partly as a political enterprise. Its adherents seek to mobilize resources (financial and intellectual) to usher in a "different" Russia, believing change is both possible and necessary, yet this view precludes any interaction with the ruling elite.

The second view is largely based on a significant decline in interest regarding Russia's internal affairs. Often, Russians complain that the West fails to understand them. But this misunderstanding arises not from ignorance, but because Russia has not been a priority and is now regarded as a natural disaster. Russia no longer occupies the position it believes it holds in Western strategies. Over the last year, I have personally noted a general disinterest in the West regarding Putin’s regime, its potential successors, the elites, or protests. The thinking is: let them live as they wish, but we will devise our strategies based on the risks associated with an unpredictable Russia. Trump’s peace plan, to an extent, is predicated on this notion: buying off Russia while significantly bolstering what remains of Ukraine. In the USA, the focus has long shifted to China.

In this context, it's important to acknowledge that there is no "peace process," about which there is much talk (and simultaneously fear and hope) in Russia. Neither side in the West desires or deems it necessary to strategize negotiations with Putin. Tactical manoeuvres might be possible, but there will be no strategic agreements. All of Putin's signals that the war could be stopped tomorrow if Ukraine accepts his ultimatum are ignored in the West. Therefore, the most that can be expected in the next six months is a tactical truce, which will merely be one phase of the conflict but will not bring it any closer to resolution.