French and German leadership trying hard to demonstrate unity on key issues of European security and beyond. Following the latest round of consultations, they've reaffirmed commitment to a host of joint projects: the Germans are getting engaged in ‘forward deterrence’ in practical terms; and, as usual, they will be providing assistance to Ukraine (and Lebanon). They believe in NATO as well. They are cautiously criticising Iran and even promise to definitely participate in ensuring the safety of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. As soon as conditions allow©.

The most interesting thing, of course, is the forward deterrence. Which is by no means ‘extended’, but ‘forward’. And very much nuclear.

French Rafale jets from the strategic squadron – though without nuclear weapons – have already arrived at a German airbase and flown alongside German Eurofighters. The Germans, meanwhile, have promised to take part in the next round of French ‘Poker’ series exercises practising the use of nuclear weapons; these take place four times a year.

This is more or less what this forward deterrence will look like in the coming years: French nuclear-capable aircraft will periodically fly to allied airbases, whilst allies will periodically take part in French nuclear-related exercises.

As for non-nuclear strategic capabilities, or Deep Precision Strike (DPS) in the current euromilspeak, what catches the eye is the explicit reference to the involvement of British partners and the particular focus on ballistic effectors with a range of ~2,500 km, developed by the Franco-German company ArianeGroup. We know what this is all about; the B-STRIKE 2500 system has been actively promoted for some time now. We’ll see when things move beyond cartoons©.

The question remains as to whether, sooner or later, the French will want to restore a land-based component to their nuclear forces, thereby re-establishing the nuclear triad. For now, this seems unlikely, but it is possible in the medium term. And mobile launchers can also be conveniently deployed to allied countries.

For Russia, the task is to watch and get on with our own tasks. It cannot be ruled out that, at a certain stage, there will be a need to once again reassess the structure of nuclear arsenal, the modes of combat duty for nuclear forces, and the doctrinal foundations of nuclear deterrence. The same applies to air and space defence.