Articles have started appearing again, featuring expert opinions that the Russian economy has very little time left and that the regime's collapse is rapidly approaching. Let's take a closer look at what is happening with the Russian economy.

For Russia, the year began with the worst economic situation since 2022. In February 2026, oil and gas revenues fell by nearly 50% year-on-year, real GDP contracted for two consecutive months, and the budget deficit in the first quarter reached 4.58 trillion rubles ($60.3 billion) - about 1.9% of GDP. The number of bankruptcies in 2025 rose by 31% to 568,000. The Russian government was considering cutting some expenditures by 10%.

The economy is being sustained by the war as a mechanism. Government spending, primarily defense, is replacing private demand and supporting GDP. This creates an imbalance: overall output has not yet declined, but the structure of the economy is degrading - growth is concentrated in the defense sector, while civil industries are stagnating.

The regional structure confirms this. Defense-oriented regions have shown sharp growth: +78% industrial output over three years in the Kurgan region, and +75% in Udmurtia. In contrast, the key contributors to the budget - oil and gas, metallurgy, and coal-producing regions - have fallen into deficit. In 2025, 70 out of 89 regions ended the year in the red. In some industrial regions, deficits reached 15-26% of their own revenues.

In late February, the situation was temporarily altered and improved by the escalation in the Middle East. Following the strike on Iran and the threat to the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices rose sharply: Brent exceeded $100 per barrel, and Urals rose from $44 in February to over $100 in early April. Russia's oil revenues surged by approximately $9 billion per month. The government abandoned its plans to cut spending.

However, this effect is short-term. Oil does not create sustainable growth but merely temporarily covers budget deficits. The budget is simultaneously dependent on oil prices and high military spending. This creates a critical vulnerability: any drop in prices quickly brings the deficit back.

Furthermore, this resource is physically limited. Strikes on the ports of Primorsk, Novorossiysk, and Ust-Luga have disrupted a significant part of the oil export infrastructure. Even brief pauses in the Middle East escalation have already led to price drops of 10-15%. This means the key source of revenue is unstable and dependent on external factors.

Meanwhile, domestic problems are mounting. Metallurgy has cut back on production, the construction sector has declined, and new projects are being scaled back en masse. The coal industry has lost its export markets and faces competition from China. High interest rates of 15-16% are limiting lending and blocking investments. Labor shortages caused by the war and demographics are increasing business costs. Even in regions experiencing defense-related growth, this is not translating into higher household incomes.

A clear economic logic is emerging:
war → increased government spending → GDP support → inflationary pressure → high interest rates → investment decline → stagnation of the civilian economy → dependence on oil → fiscal vulnerability.

Forecasts for 2026 reflect this dynamic. Expected GDP growth is around 0.8-1%. This means stagnation, not development. The key factor is the state's ability to finance the war. If oil prices fall, infrastructure losses persist, and spending remains high, the viability of this model will quickly diminish.

Conclusion: In 2026, the Russian economy functions not as a system of growth, but as a system of maintenance. Current stability is sustained by government spending and high oil prices, but this model is unsustainable and dependent on external factors. The recession has not disappeared - it has been postponed.