We often hear about the de-dollarization of the global economy. This trend is real, but for now the dollar remains the world’s number one currency.

As of the end of 2025, the U.S. dollar still accounted for 56.77% of global foreign exchange reserves, the euro for 20.25%, and the yuan for only 1.95%. The picture is similar in international payments. According to SWIFT, in January 2026 the yuan rose to 5th place among global payment currencies, but its share was just 3.13%. The dollar remained at 49.68%, and the euro at 22.36%.

The shift away from the dollar and the euro is happening fastest where at least one of three conditions is present:

◾️First - sanctions.
This includes Russia, some of its partners, certain transactions with Iran, and countries seeking to reduce future vulnerability to U.S. financial pressure.

◾️Second - regional trade with high transaction costs.
This is why Africa and ASEAN are moving faster: the benefits of local currencies and new payment bridges are clearly felt in everyday trade.

◾️Third - the China factor.
If a country has a large trade surplus or deficit with China, or exports energy and raw materials to it, the incentive to switch to RMB increases automatically.

Who is shifting away from the dollar/euro and why:

1. China - the main systemic beneficiary.

Beijing is promoting not only the yuan, but the entire infrastructure for yuan-based settlements. According to SWIFT, in January 2026 the RMB rose to 5th place among global payment currencies with a 3.13% share. This is growth, but still far from the dollar and the euro. For now, the yuan is stronger as a regional and sanctions-driven alternative than as a full-fledged global substitute for the dollar.

2. Russia - forced to adapt.

After sanctions, Moscow turned to the yuan, the dirham, ruble-based settlements, and other workaround schemes. However, an important nuance is that shifting away from dollar-based transactions does not eliminate sanctions risks and can create systemic distortions.

As early as 2023, Russia attempted to limit trade expansion with India in rupees, as it risked accumulating over $40 billion annually in a currency with limited usability. By March 2026, according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russian companies had accumulated "hundreds of billions of dollars equivalent in rupees" in Indian accounts - funds that are effectively difficult to withdraw or use due to limited convertibility and Indian regulations.

3. India, the Gulf states, ASEAN, Africa - pragmatic users.

Here, the motivation is different: reducing conversion costs, speeding up settlements, easing pressure on reserves, and avoiding dependence on dollar liquidity shortages. India and the UAE established a Local Currency Settlement System in 2023; deals in local currencies for gold, oil, and food were reported. In Southeast Asia, AMRO notes that the share of local currency settlements within ASEAN has grown from around 7% to over 15% over five years. In Africa, PAPSS and related initiatives are advancing as tools to reduce transaction losses and save hard currency.

◾️Who loses:

The main risk for the United States, and to some extent for the EU, is not an immediate loss of currency dominance, but a loss of monetary presence and a gradual erosion of network control: fewer transactions pass through Western banks, SWIFT-linked corridors, and Western legal infrastructure. This is especially visible where non-dollar payments are combined with political motives to avoid sanctions oversight.

Smaller open economies without deep local markets may also lose. The shift to local currencies works well only where there is liquidity, hedging instruments, swaps, trust in the central bank, and sufficient bilateral trade volume. Otherwise, businesses simply replace one currency risk with another.