It seems we are returning to a time when rules at sea were set by the firing of a cannon. The sea is rapidly ceasing to be a space governed by law and is once again becoming a space of power.

The main framework that maintains order at sea is UNCLOS. The Convention defines where a state’s sovereignty ends, where freedom of navigation begins, who has rights to resources, and how maritime disputes should be resolved. The idea embedded in the Convention is simple: the sea must not become a zone of chaos. It should be a space where the rights of states are determined not by force, but by law.

◾️ China is a party to UNCLOS. However, it appears that Beijing recognizes the rules only as long as they serve its interests. When the rules conflict with its claims, China simply ignores them.

In the South China Sea, China advances excessive maritime claims that were rejected by international arbitration in the case of Philippines v. China. Beijing, however, did not accept the ruling and continues to assert its claims through de facto control, infrastructure, and the use of force.

This undermines a core principle of UNCLOS: maritime rights must be determined by law, not by historical myths or coercion.

◾️ Russia acts even more openly. It is also a party to UNCLOS. But while China undermines maritime law through selective interpretation and de facto control, Russia is dismantling it through overt force.

The seizure of Crimea, attempts to rewrite maritime rights in the Black and Azov Seas, strikes on ports, and threats to civilian shipping all amount to a forceful redrawing of maritime space.

Russia operates within the legal system formally, yet uses war to destroy it.

◾️ Iran is a different, but equally critical case.

Unlike Russia and China, Iran is not a party to UNCLOS. It has signed the Convention but has not ratified it, giving Tehran greater political room for maneuver.

This is why Iran is turning the Strait of Hormuz from a global trade route into an instrument of leverage.

◾️ Another issue is the role of key non-participants in the Convention.

The most prominent example is the United States. Washington has not ratified UNCLOS, although it consistently advocates for freedom of navigation and largely acts in line with the Convention.

This does not make the U.S. the main violator, but it creates a clear vulnerability: a state that follows maritime rules has not formally joined the main treaty that establishes them.

Turkey is also not a party to UNCLOS, which is particularly significant in contested areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.

In such cases, states do not directly undermine the system, but neither do they contribute to strengthening it.

Maritime law is not something fixed forever - it is a complex and evolving system. And it requires adaptation.

We are already seeing that maritime confrontation no longer looks the way it used to. To inflict serious damage, it is no longer necessary to have a large fleet. Increasingly, advantage is determined by drones, missiles, unmanned platforms, and strikes on ports and critical infrastructure. Maritime areas can be kept under constant threat, and access to maritime infrastructure can effectively be blocked without formally seizing territory.

These new realities require updated rules. Chaos in the world’s oceans would benefit no one. Yet it seems we cannot avoid a difficult and conflict-prone transition toward an updated system of international maritime law. One can only hope that its core will remain the central idea of UNCLOS: the sea must remain a space of rules, not a space of force.