School of Hard Knocks
@sohk_1
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Article 2.2: Member State Responsibilities
(c) Each Member State shall serve a term of no more than three years from this Charter’s entry into force, subject to renewal by the Chairman. The three-year membership term shall not apply to Member States that contribute more than USD $1,000,000,000 in cash funds to the Board of Peace within the first year of the Charter’s entry into force.
Article 2.3: Termination of Membership
Membership shall terminate upon the earlier of: (i) expiration of a three-year term, subject to Article 2.2(c) and renewal by the Chairman; (ii) withdrawal, consistent with Article 2.4; (iii) a removal decision by the Chairman, subject to a veto by a two-thirds majority of Member States: or (iv) dissolution of the Board of Peace pursuant to Chapter X. A Member State whose membership terminates shall also cease to be a Party to the Charter, but such State may be invited again to become a Member State, in accordance with Article 2.1.
Article 3.2: Chairman
(a) Donald J. Trump shall serve as inaugural Chairman of the Board of Peace, and he shall separately serve as inaugural representative of the United States of America, subject only to the provisions of Chapter III.
The post-Cold War era is over. The world faces yet another historic inflection point. US-Russia relations are no longer central to global international relations, but when it comes to global security there is barely more important bilateral relationship in the world. The previous paradigm for the relationship has been exhausted, yet no new paradigm has yet emerged as of now. It may take some time – and a few election cycles in the US and a change of power in the Kremlin – to create a situation that is qualitatively different from what we are observing today.
Today, both the US and Russia are, for their own reasons, looking inward. The state of relations between Russia and the United States is now less determined by bilateral dynamics and more by domestic considerations and the overall outside dynamics – be these the crisis over Ukraine, the developments in the post-Soviet space, the Middle East or Asia-Pacific. This is the new normal in the relationship. No matter how serious or successful Russia’s Pivot to the East is, it is neither the replacement nor escape from Russia’s own strategy towards the West. If the systemic problems that continue to plague US-Russia relations are still in place, it will echo in the Asia-Pacific where Moscow and Washington may very soon discover that they have diverging interests as well.
Five years hence, we may well see a picture similar to what we are observing today: Russia and the US on opposite ends of almost every regional conflict; persistent divisions in some of the post-Soviet states; economic crises that have not brought the parties together. Looking at the relationship in a ten-year perspective, there is a chance that relations will have a more optimistic outlook. In fact, both countries face three of the same major challenges that may define them in the 21st century: how smoothly they navigate periods of elite change; what type of social contract and control system their governments establish with the so-called Big Tech; and their respective relationships with other influential regional powers (India, the EU, Türkiye, Iran, etc.). Russia and the US may still hold divergent values, but they may also emerge as the two big powers that understand each other’s red lines and do not interfere in each other’s internal affairs. If not, a decade from now, commentators will still be referring to the level of the US-Russian relations as being the lowest since the end of the Cold War.
00:52 Diplomacy as a true calling
03:05 Is multilateral diplomacy in decline?
04:53 IAEA flagship projects under the leadership of DG Grossi
07:26 Iranian issue
09:54 What can be said in response to critics of international institutions?
12:28 What does Russia bring to the IAEA table?
14:35 From Vienna to New York?
18:33 What’s the daily routine of the Head of the IAEA?
21:01 What makes DG Grossi believe in diplomacy and humanity?
23:03 Q&A surprise
Far from delivering the “great prize” of Ukraine to the West, the Euromaidan tore the country apart as the passions ignited by the protests and stoked by the likes of Nuland and McCain polarized and radicalized Ukraine’s population. This outcome was entirely predictable. Ukraine had always been a divided society and fragile state. What is more, Washington’s recklessness had even reversed the domino theory of democratization. Far from undermining Putin, the Euromaidan had consolidated support for him where it counted most: at home and in eastern Ukraine.
Washington’s second cardinal strategic error was that it had gotten America embroiled in a struggle of peripheral interest to it but of vital interest to its rival, Moscow. Even Barack Obama acknowledged this reality: Because Ukraine was a core interest for Russia but not for the United States, Washington would inevitably face significant disadvantages there.
This administration is indeed moving very fast on things but such is the demand of modern times. I’d, however, argue there hasn’t been a swift substantive turn in US-Russia relations just yet. A mount of problems that have accumulated over the past few years is still there. The US, despite President Trump claims to forge a peace deal, is still a de facto party to the conflict since it helps Ukraine militarily, intelligence-wise and provides financial aid. But the very attitude and the very approach on the US side has changed, at least as far as the administration is concerned. This is very much appreciated in Moscow and seen within policy-making community as an opportunity to strive for something bigger.
Russia is not going to back down on its key security interests in Ukraine or elsewhere. Neither will the United States.
That said, there’s a recognition that the current situation provides a certain window of opportunity that may not last long. For instance, it’s hard to fathom the composition of US politics in 18 months from now after the midterms and later after 2028. This creates a situation where on the one hand there is reasonable willingness on the side of Moscow to get as many good things done with the Trump administration as possible; on the other – makes Russia carefully consider each proposal coming from the U.S., weight in its pros and cons, time limits, political constraints. Russia is not desperate to agree to everything simply out of fear to lose the opportunity to improve relations with the U.S. – after all, it’s a seasoned geopolitical player that can’t afford to trade its security interests for goodies.
But there’s a recognition that we have a genuine chance to start a fresh page with the US precisely because of the new thinking in Washington. History is a tough teacher and it doesn’t provide too many chances to correct the course. But when it does, these chances better be embraced.
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