Are Hybrid Wars an all-Russian Invention?

Hybrid warfare (HW) has become a buzz word in virtually any debate on modern-day conflict. Introduced to policy discourse in the early 2000s, its meaning went through a number of evolutionary stages until its operational use has become so frivolous and frequent it has almost grown to be an element of political pop culture. While military officials have started to use the term HW in their countries’ official doctrines, the term especially penetrated – and plagued – policy and academic debates 🤷‍♂️

In Russia, the HW concept experienced its own deflection. Until a few years ago, the term was not part of the official Russian lexicon. Before the war in Ukraine, Russian sources would occasionally use the term to either discuss one of the trends in the American way of war or to refer to the US threat perception🕵️

However, after 2014, as much as the current Western vision for HW is centered on Russia, Russia’s own vision for HW is exclusively West centered in that it sees – and frames – any conflict from Syria to Ukraine and from Venezuela to Belarus, and even the clash of very agendas – from sports to COVID19 vaccination to Eurovision song contest – as a ‘hybrid warfare’ the West wages on Russia 🥷

The asymmetry of capabilities, experiences, and practices stresses different priorities for Russian and Western political leaderships and militaries when it comes to HW. As a result, Russia mostly focuses on how to prevent ‘colour revolutions’ and how to counter associated ‘information warfare’, whereas the West stresses the need to fend off subversion and interference, including in the cyber domain 💻

Here's my article for the "Small Wars and Insurgencies" Journal which critically examines how the hybrid warfare concept informs Russian academic and policy debate and how it impacts Russian political and military practice.