Russian Mission Vienna

🇷🇺 Right of reply by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 69th Session of the Working Group on Administrative and Financial Issues of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

📍Vienna, May 18, 2026

‼️We regret that not all delegations today share our commitment to constructive and depoliticized work of WGA. Among such countries are the Republic of Korea, the United States and Japan. In this regard, we are compelled to recall that the issue of the so-called “denuclearization of the DPRK” is not on the agenda. It is perfectly obvious who is responsible for the current state of affairs and who is escalating tensions in the nuclear sphere and raising the stakes on the Korean Peninsula.

Instead of seeking political and diplomatic solutions, the United States and its regional allies have for decades been conducting series of large-scale military exercises on a regular basis, rehearsing various offensive scenarios, including the possible use of nuclear weapons against the DPRK. In essence, the United States is moving towards the creation in Northeast Asia of a “nuclear alliance” involving the Republic of Korea and Japan on the basis of the Washington Declaration, which provides for “extended nuclear deterrence”.

It is precisely this irresponsible, confrontational and provocative policy that creates a real and extremely serious threat to regional security, while also running counter to UN Security Council resolutions emphasizing the importance of reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, it undermines the fundamental principle of indivisible security, thereby pushing Pyongyang towards maintaining its own nuclear deterrent capabilities.

In its statement, the United States called on States Signatories to “leave the past behind and focus on the future” in the context of the CTBT. We are not at all surprised to hear such words precisely from that delegation. They propose that we forget that it was Washington itself which, by avoiding ratification of the Treaty for 30 years, brought the Organization to the status in which it now finds itself. It is also logical that the United States would prefer us to forget how, at the end of last year, President Donald Trump instructed the Department of War to prepare for the resumption of nuclear testing “on an equal basis” with Russia and China. And, naturally, the United States would surely like everyone to forget its many years of baseless and provocative accusations against other countries regarding the alleged conduct of clandestine nuclear tests.

As for the future, the proposal put forward by the U.S. delegation to reduce activities and expenditures related to on-site inspections is highly revealing. This demonstrates that, even in the future, the United States does not intend to take steps aimed at facilitating the Treaty’s entry into force. The CTBT verification regime is an indivisible and integral system. One cannot benefit from one part of it while ignoring the needs of another. In the current atmosphere of accusations and mistrust, many issues could have been easily avoided if the CTBT had entered into force and the on-site inspection mechanism had been fully operational.